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Extra-Statutory Discovery
Requirements: Violating the Twin
Purposes of 28 U.S.C. Section 1782
ABSTRACT

This Note analyzes Section 1782 of United States Code
Chapter 28 and its role in the realm of internationaljudicial
assistance. The twin aims of Section 1782 are: (1) to provide
efficient means of assistance to participants In foreign
litigation, and (2) to encourageforeign countries by example to
provide similar assistanceto U.S. litigants in court. This Note
posits that these goals are violated when a district court,
considering a requestfor documents, imposes a threshold,
extra-statutory requirement that the material requested be
discoverable in the foreign Jurisdiction where the litigation is
pending.
After analyzing the legislative history of Section 1782,
including the commentary of persons involved in the drafting
of its most current version, the Note delves into the case law
that both supports and opposes the threshold discoverability
requirement The Note then examines why the Second Circuit,
in Euromepa S.A. v. Emersian, Inc., correctly determined
that imposing a threshold discoverability requirement is
improper. The Note concludes by suggesting the most
prudent approachfor a district court when considering a
Section 1782 request in light of concerns of comity and the
internationallegal system.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As the world grows smaller and international intercourse
more common, the importance of countries' working together to
increase the efficiency and strength of legal and diplomatic
relations expands exponentially.' Entitled "Assistance to foreign
and international tribunals and to litigants before such
tribunals," Section 1782 of United States Code Chapter 28
(Section 1782 or the Statute), in part, addresses the need to

1.
See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("As surely as people, products, and problems move
freely among adjoining countries, so national interests cross territorial
borders.... Every nation must often rely on other countries to help it achieve its
regulatory expectations."). See also Stephen B. Burbank, Practiceand Procedure:
The World In Our Courts, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1456, 1456 (1991) ("International civil
litigation shares with complex litigation... increasing practical importance. .... .
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coordinate judicial systems and authorizes, inter alia, district
courts to grant discovery to aid in a foreign proceeding. 2 The
Second Circuit has outlined the twin aims of Section 1782;
adherence to these twin aims-in essence, efficiency and
facilitate coordination
encouragement of reciprocity 3-will
between judicial systems as well as preserve stability and promote
comity in the international legal system. Although infrequently
invoked, Section 1782 has gained in importance at a time when
disagreement among U.S. courts concerning its interpretation and
application, unfortunately, has grown as well.
The current confusion and discord that undermines a unified
application of the statute in U.S. courts centers around whether
material sought under a Section 1782 discovery request must also
be discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction where the main
proceeding is taking place. The Second Circuit has championed a
literal interpretation of the statutory language and has not4
engrafted onto the statute an additional hurdle of discoverability.

2.

28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988) [hereinafter § 1782] provides:

(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is
found may order [that person] to give... testimony or [a] statement or to
produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal. The order may be made pursuant to a letter
rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or
upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the
testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be
produced, before a person appointed by the court. By virtue of [the]
appointment. the person appointed has power to administer any necessary
oath and take the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the
practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and
procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking
the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing. To
the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or
statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give... testimony or [a] statement
or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally
applicable privilege.
(b) This chapter does not preclude a person within the United States
from voluntarily giving .

.

. testimony or [a] statement, or producing a

document or other thing, for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal before any person and in any manner acceptable to
him.
The twin aims of § 1782 are: (1) to provide "efficient means of
3.
assistance to participants" in foreign litigation, and (2) to encourage "foreign
countries by example to provide similar means of assistance" to U.S. litigants in
court. In re Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 443 (1993) (citing In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d
97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992)).
See Glanoli, 3 F.3d at 54; Malev, 964 F.2d at 97.
4.

120

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:117

Conversely, the First and Eleventh Circuits have required
discoverability of the requested material in the foreign jurisdiction
prior to granting the requested material to the litigants.5 At its
foundation, this split of opinion represents a philosophical
difference in interpreting the role of United States courts in
international litigation. Specifically, the problem focuses on one
element: discretion.

Section 1782 provides district courts broad

8
discretion in granting or denying requests.

The solution to this controversy does not require U.S. district
courts to forfeit any of their judicial discretion. Rather, Judges
faced with Section 1782 requests must seek to fulfill the twin
aims of the statute. Judges must also ensure, however, that
requests are not abusive and do not involve dilatory behavior or
7
delay tactics on the part of the applicant.

This Note is comprised of three main sections.

Part II

chronicles the legislative history of Section 1782 and culminates
with the most recent amendment in 1964. Also, Part III provides
an overview and analysis of the relevant U.S. case law,
concentrating on decisions rendered by the First, Second, and
Eleventh circuits, as well as some important district court
opinions. Also, Part III focuses on one Second Circuit case,
Euromepa S.A. v. R. Emerslan, Inc.,8 which presents both sides of
the seminal issue:
should district court judges impose a
threshold discoverability requirement, or is discoverability instead
a discretionary tool, available to a judge when deemed necessary?
Part IV attempts to find a solution to this problem and relies most
heavily on the opinions expressed by the Second Circuit in its
Euromepa decision, but also incorporates the concerns of the
circuits favoring a discoverability requirement for Section 1782
requests. Part IV also includes a literal reading of the statute and
relies on an explicit and dispositive legislative history. Part IV
concludes that, while the proposed solution disregards an extrastatutory hurdle and permits discoverability to be used as a
discretionary tool, judges, in the exercise of their wide discretion,
must remain mindful that their decisions have implications not

5.
See In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992);
Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1988).
6.
Glanoll, 3 F.3d at 59.
7.
Dilatory tactics and abusive requests have been the stated concerns of
the circuits supporting a discoverability requirement. The greatest fear of these
courts appears to be that if the material requested Is not discoverable in the
foreign jurisdiction but is granted in a U.S. proceeding, a litigant will be able to
circumvent the rules of the foreign jurisdiction and WIl thus gain an unfair

advantage over its opponent. Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 5. These courts are also

mindful of the burdens that these often hefty requests will place on our already
over-burdened federal courts system. Id. at 7.
8.
51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995).
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only for the U.S. federal courts system, but also for the

international legal system.
I.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 28 U.S.C. SECTION 1782

A. The Pre-1964Amendment
One of the essential features of Section 1782 is that, unlike
other procedures, 9 it is relatively informal and bypasses many of
the bureaucratic headaches that accompany other methods of
foreign requests for assistance.' 0 The scope of Section 1782 has
not always been so broad. The United States Congress first
granted courts the power to assist foreign courts in 1855.11
Congress' new foreign assistance statute, enacted eight years
later, effectively superseded the old statute. 12 The Act of March 3,
1863, restricted the powers that the district courts had enjoyed
under the prior act.' 3 Courts could now obtain testimony only if

Compare the procedures for requests under the Convention on the
9.
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23
U.S.T. 2555, 2558, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, 232 [hereinafter the Hague Evidence
Convention]. Under the Hague Evidence Convention, the procedures are rather
simple, yet nonetheless more complex than a request under § 1782. Pursuant to
the procedures under the Convention, all requests are channeled through a
Central Authority designated by each signatory nation, and the requesting party
must submit several forms. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra, at 2558-59.
Under § 1782, the district court receives the requests directly.
Stephen M. Saraisky, Comment, How to Construe Section 1782: A
10.
Textual Prescription to Restore the Judge's Discretion. 61 U. CHl. L. REV. 1127,
1127-28 (1994).
Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630. Section 2 of the Act
11.
of March 2, 1855, provides:
And be it further enacted, that where letters rogatory shall have be
[sic] addressed, from any court of a foreign country to any circuit court of
the United States, and a United States commissioner designated by said
circuit court to make the examination of witnesses in said letters
mentioned, said commissioner shall be empowered to compel the
witnesses to appear and depose in the same manner as to appear and
testify in court.
Because of recording and indexing errors, the statute was "buried in oblivion."
See Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a
Programfor Reform, 62 YALE L. J. 515, 540 (1953).
Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, § 1, 12 Stat. 769 [hereinafter the 1863
12.
Act]. The 1863 Act "frustrated" the salutary effects of the 1855 Act and severely
limited the use of foreign letters rogatory. Jones, supra note 11, at 540.
The consequences of the 1863 Act were far-reaching, lasting for nearly
13.
a century. Jones, supra note 11, at 540-41.
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the foreign proceedings were "[1] for the recovery of money or
property[, 21 pending in any court in any foreign country with
which the United States are at peace, and [3] in which the

government of such foreign country shall be a party or shall have
an interest .... -14 As one author notes, a party seeking judicial
assistance was more apt to obtain that help from a state, not a
5
federal, court.1
With the end of World War II came a corresponding rise in
international litigation; 16 as a result, there was a direct need for
the United States to revamp its extraterritorial procedures. 17 Two
amendments to Section 1782 followed, and both broadened the
scope of the statute. Congress, in the 1948 Amendment, removed
the requirement that the government of the foreign country be a
party or have an interest in the proceedings and also expanded
the statute to cover "any civil action pending in any court in a
foreign country.""'
Congress further extended the reach of
Section 1782 in the 1949 Amendment,' 9 replacing the term "civil
action" with the phrase "judicial proceeding." 20 This Amendment
vastly expanded the scope of Section 1782; courts have treated
this language as meaning that litigants can use the statute to
2obtain information in criminal as well as in civil proceedings.

14.
Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, § 1, 12 Stat. 769-70.
15.
Walter A. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and
InternationalProceedings, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 597, 602 (1990) (citing, inter alla,
Christ v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. 593, 296 P. 612 (1931): People ex rel. Ickes v.
Rushworth, 294 111.455, 128 N.E. 555 (1920)).
16.
Jones, supra note 11, at 558.
17.
Id.
18.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1782, 62 Stat. 869 [hereinafter the
1948 Amendment]. The 1948 Amendment states:

The deposition of any witness residing within the United States to be
used in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country with
which the United States is at peace may be taken before a person
authorized to administer oaths designated by the district court of any
district where the witness resides or may be found ....
Id. at 949.
19.
Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 89 (1949) [hereinafter the
1949 Amendment].
20.
The 1949 Amendment further expanded the reach of § 1782:
Sec. 93. Section 1782 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
striking out from the same paragraph the words "civil action" and in lieu
thereof 'judicial proceeding.'
The 1949 Amendment, § 93, 63 Stat. at 103.
21.
See In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d
1216 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing In re Letters Rogatory from Justice Court, District
Court of Montreal, Canada, 523 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that the
omission of the phrase "civil action" meant that a litigant could use the statute to
gather information for criminal actions as well as civil actions)).
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the statute as much in
Commentators have noted that courts use
22
matters.
civil
in
as
proceedings
criminal
B. The 1964 Amendment
The United States Congress again revised Section 1782,
when, in 1958, it created the Commission on International Rules
of Judicial Procedure. 2 3 Congress requested that the Commission
"investigate and study existing practices of judicial assistance and
cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with
24
The 1964 Amendment
a view to achieving improvements."
1782 with the
of
Section
focused on liberalizing the scope
countries to
other
prompt
would
corresponding hope that this

22. See Brian E. Blomstein & Julie M. Levitt, Much Ado About 1782: A Look at
Recent Problems with Discovery in the United States for Use in Foreign Litigation
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.429, 432 (1990).
Act of September 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743. This
23.
section requested that the Commission
investigate and study existing practices of judicial assistance and
cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a view to
To the end that procedures necessary or
achieving improvements.
incidental to the conduct and settlement of litigation in State or Federal
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies which involve the performance of acts
in foreign territory, such as the service of judicial documents, the
obtaining of evidence, and the proof of foreign law, may be more readily
ascertainable, efficient, economical, or tribunals for the rendering of
assistance to foreign courts and quasi-judicial agencies be similarly
approved, the Commission shall
(a) draft for the assistance of the Secretary of State international
agreements to be negotiated by him;
(b) draft and recommend to the President any necessary
legislation;
(c) recommend to the President such other action as may appear
administrative proceedings; and
(d) perform such other related duties as the President may
assign.
Id. at 1743; see also S. REP. NO. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2-3 (1958),
reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N 5201, 5202-3 (stating the need for a comprehensive
study of the extent to which international assistance can be obtained). The
Senate Report concluded that, "the study is of such magnitude that it cannot
readily be handled by a private body or law school institute. It should be an
integrated study with participation by representatives of the bar and the
Government." Id. at 5203. The Project on International Procedure of the
Columbia University School of Law, directed by Hans Smit, a Professor of Law at
Columbia University, aided the Commission. Hans Smit, International Litigation
Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1015, 1015 (1965).
§ 2, 72 Stat. at 1743.
24.
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In other
liberalize their own judicial assistance provisions. 25
words, the revised section 1782 would, as the Gianoli and Malev
courts later stated, both provide efficient assistance to parties in
foreign litigation and encourage foreign countries by example to
provide similar assistance to U.S. litigants in court. 28
The Senate Report enunciates these twin aims as the
fundamental goals of the Amendment. 27 Specifically, the Senate
Report focuses on three aspects of the statute: (1) the grant of
wide discretion to the district courts, (2) the use of the word
"tribunal," and (3) who may qualify as a requesting party. 28 While
the grant of discretion to the district courts, as recommended in
the Senate Report, 29 directly bears on the debate over an extrastatutory requirement of discoverability, the other two central
aspects of the Senate Report have no such obvious correlation.
Still, in order to grasp the true legislative intent behind the 1964
Amendment, it is necessary to briefly examine the three central
aspects of the Senate Report and the reasoning behind them.
The proposed changes to Section 1782 expressly intended to
The committee reports first
liberalize and broaden its scope. 3 0

S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964
25.
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788 thereinafter SENATE REPORT].
26.
See In re Application of Glanoli, 3 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 443 (1993); In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964
F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992).
27.
The SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, indicated that:
Until recently, the United States has not engaged itself fully In efforts
to improve practices of international cooperation in litigation. The steadily
growing involvement of the United States in international intercourse and
the resulting increase in litigation with international aspects have
demonstrated the necessity for statutory Improvements and other devices
to facilitate the conduct of such litigation. Enactment of the proposed bill
into law will constitute a major step in bringing the United States to the
forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations
and thereby providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit
of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with International aspects.
The Commission hopes that the initiative taken by the United States in
improving its procedures will invite foreign countries similarly to adjust
their procedures.
Letter of Transmittal Accompanying S. REP. No. 1580. 88th Cong., 2d Sess. from
Rep. Oscar Cox, Chairman of Comm'n on Int'l Rules of Judicial Procedure, to
John McCormack. Speaker of the House (May 28, 1963). in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3782, 3793.
28.
Saraisky, supra note 10, at 1132.
29.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 3788.
30.
Id. This liberalization of the scope of § 1782 was visionary; It
anticipated the rise in international relations and litigation. See Morris H.
Deutsch, Comment, JudicialAssistance: Obtaining Evidence In the United States,
Under 28 U.S.C. 1782,for Use In a Foreign or InternationalTribunal, 5 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 175, 176 n.6 (1982) (stating that a significant Increase in
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deal with the need to broaden the scope of proceedings that must
be underway by using the term "tribunal."3 1 This term ensures
that "assistance is not confined to proceedings before
conventional courts."3 2 The reports also note that aside from
judicial entities requesting assistance, there was also "the
constant growth of administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings
33
Thus, in response to the diverse corpus of
all over the world."1
judicial entities requesting assistance, a United States court can
now provide assistance when, for example, "proceedings 3 4are
pending before investigating magistrates in foreign countries.
The Senate Report also displays a liberalizing intent
concerning the group of persons who may act as requesting
parties. The Statute broadens this group to include "international
tribunals and litigants before such tribunals."3 5 In comparison,
the pre-1964 Statute had limited the class of requesting parties to
those who were involved in proceedings before a conventional
court. 3 6 Consistent with one of the twin aims-providing efficient

assistance to "participants in international litigation"37 -this
progressive feature greatly broadened the scope of Section 1782.
The broad discretion given to the district court judge to either
grant or deny a request for assistance marks the boldest change
in the 1964 Amendment.3 8 The Senate Report proposes some
basic guidelines, stating:

international transactions has resulted in the increased incidence of international
litigation); Edward C. Weiner, In Search of International Evidence: A Lawyer's
Guide Through the United States Departmentof Justice, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv.60,
60 (1982) ("The United States and other countries are increasingly discovering

that their citizens engage in transnational activities that often result in lawsuits.

Obtaining evidence from foreign nations is necessary to conduct such litigation.").
31.

Stahr, supra note 15,at 604.

32.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 25,at 3788.

Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
§ 1782. 62 Stat. at 949.
36.
In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d
37.
Cir. 1992), cert. denied. 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992).
SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 3788. The Report states that "it
38.
leaves the issuance of an appropriate order to the discretion of the court which, in
proper cases. may refuse to Issue an order or may impose conditioris it deems
desirable." Id.
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In exercising its discretionary power, the court may take into
account the nature and attitudes of the government of the country
from which the request emanates and the character of the
proceedings in that country, or in the case of proceedings before an
international tribunal, the nature
of the tribunal and the character
39
of the proceedings before it.

Unfortunately, these guidelines have not fostered a unified
40

application of discretionary authority.
While these aspects of the 1964 Amendment dominated the

Senate Report, Congress implemented other liberalizing
reforms-such as deleting the word "pending" from the text of the

statute4 1-that also broadened the scope of the Statute. 4 2 In
sum, as Philip W. Amram, Chairman of the Advisory Committee
to the United States Commission on International Rules of
Judicial Procedure (Advisory Committee) expressed, the 1964
Amendment to Section 1782 provided "[w]ide judicial assistance...
granted on a wholly unilateral basis.... This is an enlightened and
far-reaching policy."43 Amram further noted that "it is not unfair
to say that [Section 1782] is a one-way street ....
It grants wide
assistance to others . . . ,,44 which strengthens the proposition
that the revised Section 1782 was not contingent on reciprocity,
though it did seek to encourage it. Amram stated that the
"sponsors of the act were not unmindful of the need for parallel

39.
Id. The Senate Report also notes that the court may "include
provisions for fees for opponents' counsel, attendance fees of witnesses, fees for
interpreters and transcribers of the testimony and similar provisions." Id.
40.
Compare In re Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 443 (1993) (holding that a district court judge has the
discretionary authority to determine if the material sought is discoverable in the
foreign jurisdiction), with In re Application of Asta Medica, 981 F.2d 1 (2d Cir,

1993) (holding that a district court judge must make a threshold inquiry Into
whether the material sought is discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction).
41.
See FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON INT'L RULES OF JUDICIAL
PROCEDURE, H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1963) (proposing the text
of the revised statute, which omits the word "pending"); see also In re Request for
Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151,
1154-55 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing omission of the word "pending" from the
1964 statute).
42.
The Senate Report also recommended that the provision providing that
judicial assistance only be granted to "countries with which the United States is
at peace" be omitted from the new statute. The Report additionally recommended
that a court use Its discretion in deciding whether to accept or deny a request.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 3789.
43.
Philip W. Amram, The Proposed International Convention on the Service
of Documents Abroad, 51 A.B.A. J. 650, 651 (1965).
44.
Id.
The Second Circuit picked up this language in In re Malev
Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 47, 101 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179
(1992).
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action abroad, so that U.S. courts and litigants could expect the
45
same generous treatment."
Other commentators concurred in Amram's opinion. Hans
Smit, the Reporter to the Advisory Committee, 46 notes that the
1964 revisions passed without any objection in Congress. He
states, 4 7 perhaps too optimistically, that the new text of Section
1782 accomplishes both a much needed liberalization and
eliminates "former uncertainties." 48 Smit also notes that the tone
of the Amendment is quite liberal in comparison to its
predecessors. He states that "it is not necessary . . . for the
proceeding to be pending at the time the evidence is sought, but
only that the evidence is eventually to be used in such a
proceeding."4 9 Smit notes that the use of the word "tribunal" is
an important, yet "simple extension" that "eliminates
undesirable limitations."50
Furthermore, under the revised
Section 1782, foreign and international officials, persons
designated by foreign law or international convention, or other
interested parties now can make a request for judicial
assistance. 5 1 This language epitomizes the expansive scope of the
revised statute.
Smit describes the penultimate addition to the revised
Section 1782-the grant of discretion to the district court judge in
deciding whether to accept or deny a request for judicial
assistance-as an addition of "quintessential importance." 5 2 As

the current case law reveals, 5 3 this grant of discretion has also

45.
Amram, supra note 43,at 651.
46.
Smit, supra note 23, at 1015.
47.
Id. at 1017. Smit notes that the passage of the 1964 Amendment was
crucial because "involvement in international litigation is no longer a rare
occurrence. The interest of all nations in promoting effective and efficient
administration of justice in such litigation [is] acute." Id.
48.
Id. at 1026.
49.
Id. Smit compares this version with the 1949 version of the statute, 63
Stat. 103, which included the use of the word "pending." Congress eliminated the
word "pending," he states, to "facilitate the gathering of evidence prior to the
institution of litigation abroad." Id. at 1026 n.72.
50.
Id. at 1027. Smit notes that under the revised § 1782, an "important
international court, such as the Court of Justice of the European Economic
Community, and litigants before such a court can be given any reasonable
assistance they may require." Id. at 1027 n.73.
51.
Id. at 1027. Smit adds: "New Section 1782 is based on the hope that...
the courts, inspired by a desire to accommodate their foreign brethren," will work
toward "the removal of obstacles to true international co-operation." Id. at 1028.
52.
Id. at 1029. Smit comments that this grant of discretion is a more
prudent course than attempting to "define with precision the variety of
circumstances in which the rendition of aid pursuant to its provisions would be
improper." Id.
53.
See infra Part III accompanying notes 58-200.
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proved a breeding ground for dissension among judges concerning
whether they should impose an extra-statutory requirement of
discoverability.5 4 Smit, citing his colleague Amram, states that a
district court may grant or deny assistance "upon such terms and
conditions as it deems appropriate."5 5 The intent of Section 1782
is clear from the legislative history, particularly the commentary
to the proposed revisions of the 1964 Amendment contained in
the Senate Report, and Professor Smit's lucid and consistent
interpretation of the revised Section 1782. The intent was and is
to achieve what the Second Circuit deemed Section 1782's twin
purposes:5 6 (1) to improve and make more efficient international
judicial assistance from our federal courts, with the hope that this
would (2) prompt foreign courts to act in similar fashion. 57 While
these twin purposes, like the legislative intent behind the 1964
Amendment, are seemingly clear, the case law indicates that the
text of the Statute and interpretation of that text rarely produce a
chorus of a thousand voices.

III. THE CASE LAW
This Part presents and analyzes the case law prior to the

Second Circuit's most recent decision, Euromepa S.A. v. R.
Emersian, Inc. An examination of both the district and circuit
courts' opinions in the Euromepa case then follows.

54.
CompareIn re Application of Glanoli, 3 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
dented, 114 S. Ct. 443 (1993) (holding that a district court Judge should not
impose an extra-statutory requirement of discoverability) with In re Application of
Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a district court judge
must impose an extra-statutory requirement of discoverability).
55.
Smit, supra note 23, at 1029 (citing Amram, PublicLaw No. 88-619 of
October 3, 1964-New Developments in International Judicial Assistance in the
United States of America, 32 J. BAR Ass'N D.C. 24, 31 (1965)). Despite this
statement, in a recent article, Smit rejected the practice of engrafting a
discoverability requirement onto § 1782. See Hans Smit, Recent Developments in
InternationalLitigation, 35 S. TEx. L. REV. 215, 234-35 (1994) ("Section 1782

cannot . . . be construed to impose the requirement that the evidence to be
obtained through § 1782 be discoverable... under foreign law.").
56.
In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992).

57.
These twin purposes are echoed in the Glanoli opinion. See Gianoli, 3
F.3d at 57.
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A. Cases that Impose a Threshold Discovery Requirement

1. In re Asta Medica-The First Circuit Imposes a Threshold
Discovery Requirement
In In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 5 8 the First Circuit
considered for the first time the issue of discoverability in the
foreign jurisdiction where a proceeding is pending.5 9 Appellant
Pfizer, Inc., was involved in patent litigation in France, Belgium,
England, and the Netherlands against Asta Medica, S.A., and
several other pharmaceutical companies. 60
To establish the
invalidity of Pfizer's patent, the foreign companies sought to
obtain documents and the testimony of former Pfizer employees
involved in the process. 6 1 The United States District Court for the
District of Maine eventually granted the application, filed under
6 2
Section 1782, for the requested documents and testimony.
After reviewing the legislative history, academic commentary
on Section 1782, and affidavits from foreign attorneys on the
issue of whether party evidence was obtainable from nonparty
witnesses in each of the four foreign jurisdictions, 6 3 the district
court stated that "[there is absolutely no evidence . . . that
suggests any congressional desire to impose on [U.S.] courts the
burden of investigating foreign law on matters such as
admissibility of the evidence, its discoverability in the [United
States] or any other sense . . . ."64 The district court found that
imposing a threshold discoverability requirement would place an
"onerous burden on both applicants and judges."6 5 The district
court refused to question the congressional intent behind the
liberalization of Section 1782, brushing aside "some fear of

58.
981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
59.
See John P. Donahue, Comment, Threshold Showing Required For
Forelgn Discovery Assistance Requests. 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 589, 594
(1994).
60.
Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 3.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. at 3 n.2.
The district court opinion is In re Application of Asta
Medica, 794 F.Supp. 442 (D. Me. 1992).
63.
See Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, Obtaining Evidence in
the U.S.for ForeignTribunals, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1993, at 3.
64.
794 F. Supp. at 446. The court stated that "given that Congress was
seeking to liberalize the process available to foreign litigants seeking evidence
here, [the court] conclude[s] that resolution of these foreign law issues is not
necessary to the exercise of a 1782 discretion." Id.
65.
Id.
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offending foreign tribunals."6 6 The court held that the relevant
inquiry is whether "the subject matter is generally pertinent and
that improper factors, such as harassment and unnecessary
67
expense and delay are minimized."
The First Circuit reversed the district court's decision,
denying the Section 1782 application.6 8
Several reasons
bolstered its decision to reverse.6 9 The court first stated that
under the district court's opinion, litigation in a foreign
jurisdiction with limited pretrial discovery places a United States
70
party at a "substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis the foreign party."
The court noted that "Congress did not amend Section 1782 to
place United States litigants in a more detrimental position than
71
their opponents when litigating abroad."
Next, the court reasoned that under the district court's
opinion, foreign litigants could circumvent foreign law and
procedures. 72 The court stated that "[fln amending Section 1782,
Congress did not seek to place itself on a collision course with
foreign tribunals and legislatures, which have carefully chosen
the procedures and laws best suited for their concepts of
litigation."7 3 In order to remedy this potential for abuse, the court
recognized that other courts had required, as a prerequisite to
granting a Section 1782 request, a threshold showing that the
material sought is discoverable under the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction. 7 4

66.
Id. at 446 n.9. The court noted that "Congress showed no such
fear... in enacting a statute that does not depend on reciprocity." Id.
67.
Id.
68.
In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992).
69.
Id. at 5. The court stated that the "central intent" of the 1964
Amendment was to liberalize existing U.S. procedures and also to "adjust those
procedures to the requirements of foreign practice and procedure." Id. (citing
SENATE REPoiTr, supra note 25, at 3788).

70.
Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 5. The court stated that a foreign party could
file a request for assistance under § 1782 and then "the floodgates are open for
unlimited discovery while the United States party is confined to restricted
discovery in the foreign jurisdiction." Id. See In re Application of Malev
Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1992) (Feinberg, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992).
71.
Asta Medlca, 981 F.2d at 5-6.
72.
Id. at 6.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. The court cited In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal
Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Lo Ka
Chun, 858 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988); John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp.,
754 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1985), and In re Court of the Comm'r of Patents for
Republic of South Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The D.C. Circuit has
taken the same approach. In In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution
Service of the United Kingdom. 870 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court upheld a
discovery request by the Crown Prosecution Service because the "U.S. citizen
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By requiring a threshold showing of discoverability, a court
also ensures that its Section
1782 analysis includes
considerations of international comity, which is readily apparent
in the "legislative history and purported goals of section 1782."15
Including international comity considerations in the analysis of a
Section 1782 request was essential for preserving diplomatic
relations between foreign and domestic courts. 7 6 The court stated
that if the district court opinion allowed for such liberal discovery,
it "would lead some nations to conclude that United States courts
view [foreign] laws and procedures with contempt ...
[and] the
broader goal of the statute-stimulating cooperation in
international and foreign litigation-would be defeated since
foreign jurisdictions would be reluctant to enact policies similar to
section 1782."17

The court declared irrelevant the purportedly "onerous

burden" placed on both applicants and judges in determining
whether information requested is discoverable under foreign

law.7 8 Congress, it stated, "intended that the primary burden fall

upon the applicant, who has to make a showing that the
79
information is discoverable under foreign law."
2. Eleventh Circuit Decisions in Harmony with the Asta Medica
Decision
The Eleventh Circuit, like the First Circuit, has also
championed the requirement of threshold discoverability for a

could not show that the procedures used by the district court to obtain the
requested evidence were unavailable under British discovery laws." Id. at 693.
The court clearly espoused the view that if evidence is to be obtained pursuant to
a § 1782 order, then that evidence must be discoverable in the foreign
Jurisdiction.
75.
Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 6-7. The court stated that the district court
had showed complete "indifference" to concerns of international comity. Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Id. at 7. But see Amram, supra note 43, at 651 (noting that § 1782 is a
.one way street" not requiring reciprocity).
78.
Asta Medica. 981 F.2d at 7. But see Donahue, supra note 59, at 59697.
79.
Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 7. The court did not cite to any portion of
§ 1782 or the Senate Report, despite asserting that this was the intent of
Congress. Commentators have criticized the court's holding, noting that a
discoverabilty requirement is not found in the text or legislative history of § 1782.
Commentators have also claimed that this holding presents significant barriers to

foreign litigants seeking assistance in United States courts.

See Newman &

Burrows, supra note 63, at 3; Donahue, supra note 59, at 596-97; Smit, supra
note 55, at 236-37.

132

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:117

Section 1782 application 8 0 In In re Court of the Commissioner of
Patents for the Republic of South Africa8 l (Patents), Electric
Furnace Company (Electric) presented the district court with a
Section 1782 application requesting the production of documents
from Selas Corporation (Selas) relating to a patents case pending
in the Republic of South Africa. Electric, however, had not shown
that the documents requested were discoverable under South
82
African law.
The Patents court concluded that it would not allow litigants
83
to circumvent foreign procedures imposed by foreign tribunals
because "few actions could more significantly impede the
development of international cooperation ... than if courts of the
United States operated to give litigants in foreign cases processes
of law to which they were not entitled in the appropriate foreign

tribunals.

84

Similarly, in In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of
Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago85 (Trinidadand Tobago), the

court relied on the Patents case to apply the threshold
discoverability requirement. In Trinidad and Tobago, the court
addressed the issue of whether material sought must first be
discoverable under the laws of Trinidad and Tobago. 8 6 After
recognizing the congressional intent to liberalize Section 1782,87
the court found that the material sought was discoverable under
the laws of both Trinidad and Tobago. 8 8 The court stated the

80.
See Stahr, supra note 15, at 609.
81.
In re Court of the Comm'r of Patents for Republic of South Africa, 88
F.R.D. 75, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1980) [hereinafter Patents].
82.
Patents, 88 F.R.D. at 77. The court's concern was exacerbated by the
fact that the foreign tribunal was not represented in the proceeding. Id. at 77 n. 1.
If,the court noted, the foreign tribunal was represented and could instruct the
court on the applicable law, the court would grant the order if it was consistent
with South African law. Id.
83.
Id. at 77. The court made this assertion despite only having a
suspicion that the materials requested would not be discoverable under South
African law, a result of "discussions with counsel." Id.
84.
Id.; see also Stahr, supra note 15, at 613 ("There is only one ...
situation in which foreign discoverability may be relevant in a section 1782 case:
when one party to a foreign litigation seeks discovery from another party in the
foreign litigation, as in the Patents case."). But see Lawrence W. Newman &
Michael Burrows, Productionof Evidencefor Foreign Tribunals, N.Y.L.J., May 16,
1991, at 3 (considering the Patents decision in light of the English House of Lords
case, South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Assurantie Maatchapij "De Zeven Provinclen" NV,
2 Lloyd's Rep. 317 (1986), and stating that the Patents court's foreign law
determination was an "imprecise venture").
85.
In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Action of Trinidad
and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (1 1th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Trinidadand Tobagol.
86.
Id. at 1152.
87.
Id. at 1152-54.
88.
Id. at 1156.
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proper inquiry: the district court "must decide whether the
evidence would be discoverable in the foreign country before
granting assistance."8 9 Since the Central Bank of Trinidad and
documents at issue, the
Tobago had the authority to request the
90
court granted the Section 1782 order.
The most recent Eleventh Circuit case to address the
threshold discoverability requirement is Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To (Lo
Ka Chun).9 1 In Lo Ka Chun, the court received a Section 1782
request for depositions of four Florida nonparty witnesses for use
in a Hong Kong civil proceeding. 9 2 The witnesses moved to quash
the deposition subpoenas, arguing that this form of discovery
would not be available if they were living in Hong Kong. 93 The
district court rejected this argument, stating that "the folly of this
or any other United States court, unschooled in and unfamiliar
with foreign law, attempting to predict whether foreign law would
permit the requested discovery," precluded it from considering the
94
issue.
In reversing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that "the district court must decide whether the evidence would
95
be discoverable in a foreign country before granting assistance."
Because the district court had not 6 considered the discoverability
9
issue, its decision could not stand.

89.
Id. (citing In re Court of the Comm'r of Patents for the Republic of
South Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1980)). The material requested in
Trinidad and Tobago comprised copies of bank records of Joseph Azar, in
connection with a criminal investigation of Trinidad and Tobago nationals
involved in violations of the Exchange Control Act. 848 F.2d at 1152. See Ch.
79:50, Laws of Trinidad and Tobago.
90.
Trinidadand Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1156 n.11.
91
Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1988).
92.
In re Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, No. 87-8309, slip op. at 1-2 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
19, 1987).
93.
Id. at 3.
94.
Id. at 7.
Lo Ka Chun, 858 F.2d at 1566 (citing Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d at
95.
1156).
96.
Lo Ka Chun. 858 F.2d at 1566. The court noted that if the district
court found that the evidence would be discoverable under Hong Kong law, it
could go ahead and grant the order. Id. As Stahr notes, this application of §
1782 requires analysis of foreign laws, something about which § 1782 and its
legislative history are silent. Stahr, supra note 15, at 612. Stahr notes that this
would require "many section 1782 cases to begin with a debate over foreign law."
Id. He states that the Lo Ka Chun case is a good example; the affidavits and
exhibits regarding Hong Kong law before the district court were over 400 pages.
Id. at 612 n.89. See also In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution
Service of the United Kingdom, 870 F.2d 686, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Courts
should not consider admissibility per se.); John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754
F.2d 132, 136 n.3 (3d Cr. 1985) (Courts should not "predict or construe the
procedural or substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction....").
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3. Recent District Court Decision Upholds the Asta Medica
Doctrine
A recent opinion of the California Central District Court
upheld the Asta Medlica court and imposed a discoverability
requirement for information sought pursuant to a Section 1782
request. 9 7 The lawsuit, In re Applicationfor an Orderfor Judicial
Assistance in a Foreign Proceeding in the High Court of Justice,
Chancery Division, England (JudicialAssistance), arose out of a
dispute regarding the alleged misappropriation of trust funds. 9 8
Appellees, appointed by a London court as trustees over missing

funds, fied an action against several foreign defendants, then
amended the complaint to include a U.S. citizen, the appellant in
this case. 9 9 The magistrate judge granted a Section 1782 request,
requiring appellant to produce documents and have his
deposition taken.' 0 0 Upon review, the district court reversed the
magistrate's ruling.' 0 1
The court stated that the "[miagistrate judge's interpretation
of Section 1782 [could not] stand and Appellees [were] not entitled
to discovery beyond what [was] available to them in the foreign
court in which the action [was] proceeding. '' 1° 2 The court then
distinguished cases that the Appellees cited to support the claim
that there is no requirement of a threshold showing of
discoverability in a Section 1782 request. 0 3 The court noted that
these cases all involved a direct request for assistance from a
foreign tribunal; therefore, "it [was] clear that the discovery
sought [was] permitted and authorized by that body.' 0 4 This
direct request from a foreign tribunal perhaps assuaged the
court's fear of litigants circumventing foreign law or utilizing
Section 1782 as a form of harassment. The court's interpretation
of Section 1782's purpose was "to foster jurisprudential comity
and cooperation between the United States and foreign countries.
This court [did] not believe that Congress intended to pass

97.
In re Application for an Order for Judicial Assistance in a Foreign
Proceeding in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, England, 147 F.R.D.
223 (C.D. Cal. 1993) [hereinafter JudicialAssistance).

98.

Id. at 224.

99.
Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 226.
103. Appellees cited In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo District, Tokyo,
Japan, 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976), In re Letters Rogatory from the City of
Haugesund, Norway, 497 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974), and In re Letters of Request to

Examine Witnesses from the Court of Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Canada, 488
F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1973).
104. JudicialAssistance, 147 F.R.D. at 226.

19961

EXTRA-STATUTORY DISCOVERY REQUIREMENTS

135

legislation that would significantly weaken the position of United
States citizens in foreign legal proceedings.'1 0 5 Since an adverse
party made the request under Section 1782 in this case, the court

noted that it had to be careful to prevent circumvention of foreign

discovery laws.' 0 6 The court concluded that its decision would
promote good relations and invite foreign courts to reciprocate in
07

the future.1

B. Cases that Do Not Impose a Threshold Discovery Requirement

1. The Second Circuit Decisions-Diametric Opposition to the
Asta Medica Doctrine of a Threshold Discovery Requirement
The Second Circuit first addressed the issue of a threshold
discoverability requirement for material requested under Section
1782 in In re Application of Malev HungarianAirlines.10 8 In Malev,

Pratt & Whitney, an airplane manufacturer, filed a complaint in
the Municipal Court of Budapest, Hungary, against Malev, the
Hungarian national airline.' 0 9 Four days after filing its answer,
Malev instituted an action in the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut," l 0 requesting that the district court

grant an order pursuant to Section 1782 that would permit
discovery of Pratt & Whitney in the United States."' The district
court denied the order, fmding that Malev's request was
"premature" because Malev never attempted this form of discovery

before the Hungarian court. 112 The court concluded that since
discovery procedures were "fully available" to Malev under

105. Id. The court stated that the intent behind the statute was to
"facilitate compliance by U.S. citizens with foreign court proceedings and to
maintain respect for foreign countries' sovereign jurisdiction." Id. Compare this
view of the congressional intent behind § 1782 with that expressed in In re
Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992). cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992).
106. JudclalAssLstance, 147 F.R.D. at 226 (citing John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry
Corp.. 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985)).
107. Id. Smit, in criticizing the decision, stated that the discoverability
requirement had "superficial appeal," but that it was in neither "the letter nor the
spirit of§ 1782." Smit, supra note 55, at 236.
108. 964 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992).
109. Id.at 98.
110. Id.
111. Id. Specifically, Malev sought to depose certain employees of Pratt &
Whitney who resided in Connecticut and to obtain 18 groups of documents that
were supposedly relevant to the litigation in Hungary. Id.
112. Id. at 100.
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Hungarian law, Malev should have first sought discovery from the
Hungarian court. 113
In reversing the lower court, the Second Circuit found
nothing in the text and legislative history of Section 1782 that
"would support a quasi-exhaustion requirement of the sort
imposed by the district court."1 14 The Second Circuit wrote that
requiring an interested person to first seek discovery from the
foreign tribunal would conflict with the twin purposes of Section
1782 and would effectively "impose an additional burden on
persons seeking assistance from our federal courts for matters
relating to international litigation." 115
The Malev court addressed the concerns of the district court
but did not find them dispositive. 1 16 Specifically, the court noted
that making discovery available through Section 1782 "potentially
impose[d] heavy burdens on our federal courts ...
"117 Laying
the foundation for the Gianoll opinion, the Malev court reasoned
that district courts could exercise discretion to alleviate the
burdens imposed by Section 1782,118 but could not impose what
amounted to "extra-statutory barriers to obtaining discovery such
as an exhaustion requirement." 1 9

113. Id. The district court also noted that the Hungarian court never
sought the involvement of U.S. courts in overseeing discovery and the district
court said such oversight would "unnecessarily complicate the case" and burden
U.S. courts. Id; see also Deborah Pines, Divided Panel Allows Discovery In Foreign
Lawsuit, N.Y.L.J., May 7, 1992. at 1.
114. In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines. 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert. dented, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992). The Court's brief analysis of the
applicable text of Section 1782 reveals that no quasi-exhaustion requirement
exists. The court stated that Section 1782 allows an interested person to apply to
the district in which the person from whom discovery is sought resides, and that
upon application, the district court may "order [that person] to give... testimony
or [a] statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding
in a foreign or international tribunal." Id. (citing Section 1782).
115. Malev, 964 F.2d at 100; see Robert C. Bata & Kenneth Pasquale,
Discovery Rights UnderRule 1782 Affirmed, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9,1993, at 5 ("[Sluch a
requirement would contradict the goals of the statute... ").
116. Malev, 964 F.2d at 100; see Tarlq Mundiya, Comment, U.S. Court
Invites Foreign Litigants to Use U.S. Discovery Laws, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 356,
358-59 (1993) (explaining the Second Circuit's rejection of the district court's
concerns).
117. Malev, 964 F.2d at 100; see Herbert N. Ramy, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L.J. 230, 237 (1994) ("While the appeals court empathized with the district court's
fears, it determined that Congress' intent as expressed through § 1782 should
control.").
118. Malev. 964 F.2d at 100.
119. Id. See Bata & Pasquale, supra note 115. at 5.
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Finally, the Second Circuit dismissed the district court's

concern about reciprocal discovery problems. 120 On remand, the
court advised the lower court to utilize its powers under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) to limit discovery if it thought the
request too burdensome or cumulative. 12 1 This would enable the

lower court to minimize the burdens of discovery and still remain
within the parameters of Section 1782.122

Judge Feinberg, writing in dissent, stated that the majority

had interpreted the statute too literally. 123

According to Judge

Feinberg, the majority's opinion would require U.S. courts to
become "Special Masters for Discovery." 124
The dissent

contended that Malev never showed a need to invoke Section
1782,125 and that Malev first should have gone through discovery
procedures in the Hungarian court. 12 6 The dissent did not deem
this "quasi-exhaustion,"'127 but concluded that a "quasiexhaustion" requirement was consistent with the purposes of
Section 1782.128

120. Malev, 964 F.2d at 101 (citing Amram, supra note 43, at 651) ("[Section
17821 is a one way street. It grants wide assistance to others, but demands
nothing in return. It was deliberately drawn this way. .. ").
121. Malev, 964 F.2d at 102. The court proposed that the district court
could require Malev to submit a discovery plan and make a showing that the
discovery is "not obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive," like the Hungarian court. Id.; see also Bata &
Pasquale. supra note 115, at 5 ("The Malev decision does not grant license to a
party in a foreign litigation to obtain unlimited discovery in the United States.").
122. Malev, 964 F.2d at 102. In the underlying litigation, the Hungarian
court rendered a partial decision for Pratt & Whitney; the Hungarian Supreme
Court reversed and dismissed the action against Malev. See Bata & Pasquale.
supra note 115, at 5. The authors note that it is important for the party
requesting assistance under § 1782 to remember that "unless it gets quick relief
in the district court, it runs the risk of an adverse foreign judgment, because
foreign courts have no obligation to put up with calendar congestion in the United
States." Id.
123. Malev, 964 F.2d at 102 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). The result was the
creation of a "precedent that bodes ill for a federal judicial system that is
struggling to stay afloat." Id. For an endorsement of Feinberg's stance, see
Mundiya, supra note 116, at 360-66. For the opposing view, see Ramy, supra
note 117, at 239-41.
124. Malev, 964 F.2d at 103 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 105.
126. Id. at 105. If, Feinberg questioned, the district court judge can impose
this requirement, "why bar it at the outset?" Id.
127. Id.; see Mundlya, supra note 116, at 360.
128. Malev, 964 F.2d at 105 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). Though not written
into the statute, the dissent stated that § 1782 appeared to be a perfect instance
for applying the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. Id.
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In In re Application of Glanoli,129 the Second Circuit again
considered the issue of a threshold discoverability requirement.
In Gianoll, the court addressed a Section 1782 discovery order
requesting documents and testimony concerning assets held by a
Chilean holding company, Casabianca Investments, S.A., and the
whereabouts of those assets. I3 0 The order asserted that
"information about these assets is relevant to, and will be used in,
the guardianship proceeding in the Chilean Court, in which the
guardians must file an inventory of [Ciro Glanoli's] assets
wherever they may be found."''
In granting the order to produce
documents and appear for depositions, the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut held, inter alla, that Section
1782 does not require that the evidence sought in a district court
13 2
be discoverable under Chilean law.

A unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
decision.13 3 The court began by noting that the primary intent of
" 1 34
the amendment was to "liberalize existing U.S. procedures.
The court reached the issue of whether to impose an extrastatutory discovery requirement, concluding that these changes
served the "twin aims of providing efficient means of assistance to
participants in international litigation in our federal courts and
encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar
means of assistance."1 3 5 Appellants averred that appellees were
limited to "information they could obtain within their own
country, but not more."' 3 6 The court reasoned first that the
language of the statute simply could not support such a

129.
3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 443 (1993).
130. Id. at 56. The litigation arose when Ciro Gianoli Martinez, a wealthy
Chilean businessman, began to deteriorate in health. Id. at 55. All his living
descendants commenced an incompetency proceeding; the provisional guardians,
the appellees, filed an inventory of all of Gianoli's assets located in Chile with the
Third Civil Court. Id. at 56. Determining that Gianoli held significant assets
abroad, the appellees, in order to provide a complete inventory, filed this
application under § 1782. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The district court also held that the requirements of § 1782 had
been met and that "in any event, Chilean law empowers the Appellees to obtain
the information requested." Id. at 57.
133.
Id. at 54.
134.
Id. at 57-58. Specifically, the court discussed the 1964 Amendment.
135.
Id. at 58 (citing In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d
97 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992)).
136.
Glanoll, 3 F.3d at 58. Appellants relied on decisions handed down in
four other circuits. See In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 7 (1st
Cir. 1992); In re Request from Crown Prosecution Service of United Kingdom, 870
F.2d 686, 692-93 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564, 1566
(11th Cir. 1988); John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir.
1985).
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reading. 3 7 The court stated that if "Congress had intended to
impose such a sweeping restriction on the district court's
discretion, at a time when it was enacting liberalizing
amendments to the statute, it would have included statutory
language to that effect." 138 The Gianoli court, however, pointed
out that a finding of discoverability might nonetheless serve as a
useful tool for district court judges in the exercise of discretion
granted them under Section 1782.139
The court recognized the legitimacy of the policy
considerations, such as preventing circumvention of foreign
limitations on discovery and avoiding offense to foreign
tribunals, 140 that motivated the First and Eleventh Circuits to
imply a threshold showing of discovery under the laws of the
foreign jurisdiction. 14 1 The Glanoli court nevertheless rejected the
contention that these considerations favored reading into Section
1782 a threshold showing of discovery. 14 2 Rather, the court
concerns be addressed by
"believe[d] Congress intended that these143
a district judge's exercise of discretion."
The court also considered whether the district court judge
had abused his discretion by issuing the order. 14 4 The court was
satisfied that the district court judge had exercised sound
discretion in finding that (1) Chilean law allows provisional

137. Glanoli, 3 F.3d at 59. The court stated that the only language related
to whether a district court must adopt a discovery requirement Is "permissive
language, stating that the practice and procedure prescribed by the district court
"may be in whole or in part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or
international tribunal.'" Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782(A)).
138. Glanoll, 3 F.3d at 59. The court stated that "we are not free to read
extra-statutory barriers to discovery into section 1782." Id. (citing In re Malev
Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 179
(1992)); see also Smit, supra note 55. at 235 ("But we are not at liberty to secondguess the policy choices of our Congress.").
Gianolt, 3 F.3d at 60. See also Lawrence W. Newman & Michael
139.
Burrows, U.S. DiscoveryforForeignLitigants, N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1994, at 3.
Gianolih 3 F.3d at 60. These concerns, the court noted, were motivating
140.
forces behind the 1964 Amendment to § 1782. Id. Another policy concern was

maintaining the "balance between litigants that each nation creates within its own
judicial system." Id.
141. See In re Application ofAsta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cr. 1992); Lo
Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1988).
142. Glanoli, 3 F.3d at 60.
143. Id. at 60; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 3788.
144. Gianoll, 3 F.3d at 61. The court reviewed the appellants' assertions
that granting this order would (1) allow appellees to gain information that they
could not obtain in their home jurisdiction, raising issues of comity, and (2) open
the federal courts to waves of foreign litigants attempting to avoid limits on
pretrial discovery procedures in their home jurisdictions. Id. This Note addresses
the issue of comity in Parts III and IV.
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guardians to acquire information about assets, 145 (2) Chilean
courts could obtain this information by issuing a letter
rogatory, 14 6 (3) obtaining the information would not offend the
Chilean court but would instead assist the court in its
proceedings, 147 and (4) Chilean law does not "prohibit a litigant
from gathering evidence through methods that are lawful in the
place where those methods are undertaken." 148 While the district

court judge did not make a finding as to whether pretrial
discovery is allowed under Chilean law, he did inquire into
whether the order would circumvent Chilean limitations on
discovery 14 9 and whether the grant of discovery would offend the
Chilean court or Chilean sovereignty.' 5 0 The court concluded
that granting the order would not undermine the twin aims of
15 1
Section 1782 but would, in fact, serve them.
To summarize, both Gianoli and Malev expressly reject the
notion that a court can impose extra-statutory requirements onto
Section 1782. Both decisions, however, recognize the district
court judge's statutory authority to exercise discretion-which

145. Gltanoll, 3 F.3d at 61. The district court noted that under Article 378 of
the Civil Code of Chile. the provisional guardians had a duty to compile a
complete inventory of assets. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. This finding seemed to be dispositive for the Second Circuit and
crucial to the conclusion that granting this order would not circumvent Chilean
discovery restrictions. Id. at 62. Foreign courts are sensitive to the problems of
different discovery procedures among differing legal systems. See Blomstein &
Levitt, supra note 22, at 466. In South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Assurantie MaatchapiJ
"De Zeven Provincien" NV, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 317 (1986), a case before the British
House of Lords, the defendants, "re-reinsurers," applied directly to the District
Court for the Western District of Washington for an order pursuant to § 1782.
See Newman & Burrows, supra note 139, at 3. After noting the differences
between the two systems regarding pretrial discovery, the court held, Inter alla,
that a party could obtain evidence for trial "provided always that such means
were lawful in the country, in which they were used; and the application made by
the defendants could not be regarded as an interference with the Court's control
of its own process." 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 318. All that the defendants had done was

"what any party preparing [a] case in the High Court was entitled to do." Id The
English High Court did not appear to view § 1782 as an affront to its Judicial
system.
149. Glanoll, 3 F.2d at 61-62. Circumvention appears to be one of the
greatest fears of courts considering 9 1782 requests. See Saraisky, supra note 10,
at 1136 (describing fear that foreign litigants are trying to take advantage of the
more "liberal" U.S. discovery procedures). See also Newman & Burrows, supra
note 139, at 3 (asserting that the Glanoll court may have proposed a different
standard: "[Tihat § 1782 relief should be granted unless the law of the foreign
country forbids the obtaining of evidence abroad through such means as
§ 1782.").
150. Glanoll, 3 F.3d at 62.
151. Id.
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material requested is
may entail determining whether
discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction-and so minimize
burdensome and perhaps inappropriate discovery requests.
These discretionary orders are permissible as long as the twin
purposes of Section 1782 are furthered and not compromised.
2. Recent District Court Decisions in Harmony with the GianoliMalev Doctrine
One case in particular, In re Application of Technostroyexport,
15 2
evidences the strength of the Glanoli-Malev line of reasoning.
The petitioner Technostroy (Techno) petitioned to obtain discovery
pursuant to Section 1782 to assist in arbitration proceedings
pending in Moscow and Stockholm against International
Specifically,
Development and Trade Services, Inc. (IDTS). 153
Techno sought to obtain documents from IDTS, as well as the
15 4
deposition testimony of IDTS's president and sole shareholder.
The district court issued the subpoenas. 15 5 Techno argued that
the material requested was "imperative" to the proceedings.' 5 6

IDTS responded that Techno "should be relegated to applying to
157
the arbitration tribunals for permission to take discovery."'

The district court, on hearing a motion to quash, revised its

earlier holding. First, the court noted that Techno had made no
attempt to obtain any decision from the arbitrators.' 5 8 The court
then distinguished arbitration proceedings from regular court
proceedings, describing the respective rules and procedures as

152.
In re Application of Technostroyexport, 853 F.Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y.
1994). Another case from the Eastern District of New York is also clearly
consistent with the Gtanoli-Malev line of cases. See In re Letter of Request from
the Boras District Court, Sweden, 153 F.R.D. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), in which the
district court granted a § 1782 request from the Boras District Court, requiring
respondent to submit to a blood test to determine paternity. The court found that
the blood test requested was a standard procedure used by the Boras District
Court in paternity cases.
153.
Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. at 696.
154. Id. On January 6, 1994, Judge Mukasey signed an order permitting
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to IDTS and deposition subpoenas to its
president and sole shareholder. Id. On February 18, IDTS moved to have them
quashed, and to have the parties referred to the pending arbitration proceedings.
Id.
155. Id.
156.
Id.
157. Id. at 697.
158. Id. But see In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97
(2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992) (rejecting the "quasi-exhaustion"
requirement).

142

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:117

"radically different."1 5 9 The court stated that applicable
arbitration rules govern the matter of prehearing discovery 16 0 and
noted that "[iut has been expressly held that a Federal District
Court has no power to order discovery under court rules where
the matter is being litigated in an arbitration. " 16 1 The court then
examined the applicable Russian and Swedish laws, 16 2 finding
that they clearly delegate the determination of obtaining evidence
in arbitration proceedings to the arbitrators. 16 3
Finally, the court noted that there were no provisions in the
Russian or Swedish laws for applying to a foreign court for
assistance.16 4 Dismissing Techno's argument that this permitted
direct application to a United States court to obtain discovery,' 6 5
the court, following the approach of the Second Circuit in Gianoli
and relying on the discretion granted to it under Section 1782,166
stated that the Russian and Swedish provisions "make it clear
that in those countries it is the arbitrators, and not the courts,
who are to decide the question of what discovery is to be obtained
in arbitaration proceedings." 16 7 The court properly exercised its
statutory grant of discretion, considering all the circumstances,
and conditioned the obtaining of evidence on the approval of the
arbitrators.' 68
The court did not impose a threshold
discoverability requirement; instead, it used the Issue of

discoverability as a tool to determine whether to grant the Section
1782 request.

159. Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. at 697.
160. Id.
The court stated that "[airbitrators govern their own
proceedings...." Id.
161. Id. at 698 (citing Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid
Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)).
162. Technostroyexport, 853 F.Supp. at 698. Experts for both sides testified
concerning the Russian and Swedish Laws. Id. at 697. The court examined three
Russian laws: Rule 30 of the Rules of the Arbitration at the U.S.S.R. Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, and Articles 5 and 27 of the Law of the Russian
Federation on International Commercial Arbitration. The Swedish law that the
court examined was section 15 of the Swedish Arbitration Act. Id. at 698.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988).
167. Technostroyexport 853 F. Supp. at 698. The court stated that "parties
to arbitrations in those countries cannot bypass the arbitrators and go directly to
court." Id. at 699.
168. Id. See Newman & Burrows, supra note 139. at 3. The authors note
that this may be a prudent course of action given the "negative attitude expressed
by many European arbitrators toward discovery." Id.

19961

EXTRA-STATUTORY DISCOVERY REQUIREMENTS

143

C. The Euromepa S.A. v. R. Emersian, Inc. Decision
The Euromepa case embodies the debate surrounding Section
1782 and its correct interpretation. It demonstrates how difficult

it is to gauge and limit a judge's discretion when the judge is
faced with a Section 1782 request. The decision also reinforces
the Gtanoll-Malev line of reasoning, (i.e., the court does not
impose a threshold showing of discoverability for requested
documents).
1. The District Court Decision-Euromepa I
In In re Application of Euromepa, S.A. 16 9 (Euromepa 1), the
district court denied a request for discovery under Section 1782
for use in proceedings in a French court.170 The court first noted
that Section 1782 grants "wide discretion" to the district courts
when considering discovery requests, I7 ' and that the policy
concerns underpinning Section 1782 must guide a district court's
decision. 172 The court reasoned that in reviewing a Section 1782
request, "a balance must be struck between the policy of not
infringing upon a foreign nation's procedural rules with the policy
of promoting the efficient resolution of dispute in a foreign
tribunal." l7 3 As part of this balancing test, the court found it
The court
necessary to examine French procedural law. 1 74
(1)
be
dispositive:
system
to
French
of
the
discerned four features
over,
control
maintain
and
administer,
strictly
the French courts
the French rules on gathering and submitting evidence; 175 (2) the
judge retains authority to decide on the production of documents

169.
170.

155 F.R.D. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) [hereinafter EuromepaA].
Id. at 84.

171. Id. at 82 (citing In re Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 54, 59 (2d Cir.
1993). cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 443 (1993)).
172.

Euromepa L

155 F.R.D.

at 82

(citing In

re Application of Malev

Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179
(1992)).

173.

Euromepa1, 155 F.R.D. at 82.

174.
Id. at 82-83. The court deemed its understanding of French law to be
Its analysis has been criticized by some
a superficial one." Id. at 82.
commentators. See Newman & Burrows, supra note 139, at 3 ("The Euromepa
case also raises questions as to the extent to which the district courts can be
expected to be able to divine the attitude of foreign courts to having their
evidence-gathering procedures supplemented by applications under section
1782.").
175. Euromepa 1. 155 F.R.D. at 82-83 (citing New Code of Civil Procedure
and Related Laws, arts. 132-37 in GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., FRENCH LAW:
CONSTITUTION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLATION ch. 7 (1994) [hereinafter French New

Code].
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or testimony in court;1 7 6 (3) no mechanism exists in French

procedure for a party to require production of other documents
from an opponent without judicial intervention;1 7 7 and (4) French
law does not allow a party to take a pretrial deposition of an
opponent. 17 8

The court concluded that pretrial discovery is

179
"controlled by the court and not the parties."

In denying Euromepa's Section 1782 petition, the court made
several observations. First, the court noted that Euromepa had
not attempted to use mechanisms provided by French procedure
to obtain documents. 18 0 Second, considering the "nature and
attitudes" of the French toward discovery, Euromepa's failure to
attempt to use French procedures could not be "disregarded.''1 1
Finally, finding that Euromepa was attempting to do something
prohibited by French law, the court held that "granting this
petition would infringe on the French courts while not promoting
the efficiency of the pending appeal in France."1 8 2 The court
explicitly noted that its holding did not impose a threshold
83
discovery requirement on Euromepa.'
2. EuromepaH: The Circuit Court Decision Upholds the Twin
Aims of Section 1782
In Euromepa S.A v. R. Emersfan, Inc. 184 (Euromepa1L), the
Second Circuit reversed the district court decision. The court
stated that the district court, in essence, had imposed an "extrastatutory hurdle to obtaining discovery" by requiring Euromepa

176. Euromepa1, 155 F.R.D. at 83 (citing French New Code. supra note 175,
arts. 132-37).
177. EuromepaI, 155 F.R.D. at 83. The court noted that "ItIhese provisions
...
cannot be used for pretrial exploratory discovery." Id. (citing French New

Code, supra note 175, arts. 138-42).
178. Euromepa1. 155 F.R.D. at 83 (citing FrenchNew Code, supra note 175.
arts. 184-98).
179.
Europmepa 1, 155 F.R.D. at 83. The court added that "[tlhis policy
determination must be fully accounted for when balancing the various policy
concerns." Id.
180. Id. The court emphasized that it was not imposing a quasi-exhaustion
requirement, which the Second Circuit had expressly rejected in Malev. Id.
181.
Id. The court cited to the SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 3788.
182. Euromepa 1, 155 F.R.D. at 84. See generally Newman & Burrows,
supra note 139, at 3. ("The court... did not expressly find that [French] law
forbids efforts to obtain evidence outside France through means that are lawful in
other countries.").
183. Euromepa 1. 155 F.R.D. at 84 n.2. Commentators have suggested,
however, that the court's decision imposes a requirement that is "functionally
equivalent" to the discoverability standard. See Newman & Burrows, supra note
139, at 3.
184.
51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter EuromepaII].
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S.A. (hereinafter MEPA) to "exhaust its discovery options in
France" prior to seeking assistance in a United States court. 1 8 5
The court focused its analysis on the district court's primary

inquiry: whether this discovery request would offend the French
tribunal and appear as an "unwarranted intrusion."'8 6 The court
reaffirmed its position taken in Glanoli and Malev-that a
determination of discoverability under the laws of a foreign
jurisdiction when considering a Section 1782 request is within a
judge's discretion, but is not a threshold requirement-but
concluded that an extensive foray into examining foreign
discovery law of the forum state was undesirable and
unnecessary. 187 In this case, the court noted, the district court's
approach was ineffective and "promoted the very thing that
section 1782 was intended to avoid." 18 8 The court's scathing
review continued:
The record reveals that this litigation became a battle by affidavit of
international legal experts, and resulted in the district court's
admittedly "superficial" ruling on French law. We think it is
unwise ... for district judges to try to glean the accepted practices
and attitudes of other nations from what are likely to be conflicting
We do not read
and ... biased interpretations of foreign law...
the statute to condone such speculative forays into legal territories
unfamiliar to federal judges.... [This] cannot possibly promote the
18 9
"twin aims" of the statute.

The court then offered parameters to guide and limit a judge's
inquiry into the discoverability of requested information-an
"authoritative proof' standard. The court stated that a district

185. Id. The imposition of an extra-statutory hurdle, the court noted, was
something it had rejected in Malev. Id.
186. The Second Circuit construed the statements of the district court in
this regard, see supra note 183, as meaning that the district court was concerned
with offending the French tribunal, and not so concerned with discerning whether
"comparable discovery exists under French law ....
" Euromepa H, 51 F.3d at
1098.
187. The court cited a "chief architect of section 1782's current version,"
Professor Hans Smit, who has stated that the statute's drafters thought it would
be "wholly inappropriate for a [U.S.] district court to try to obtain this
understanding [of foreign law] for the purpose of honoring a simple request for
assistance." Euromepa , 51 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Smit, supra note 55, at 235

(1994)). The court also recognized that the Third Circuit, in John Deere Ltd., "has
already tempered the need to engage in an extensive foreign law analysis under
section 1782." Euromepa H, 51 F.3d at 1099. The John Deere court, when
considering the statements of the drafters of § 1782, stated that "to require that a
district court undertake a more extensive inquiry into the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction would seem to exceed the proper scope of section 1782." John Deere
Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1985).
188. Eurornepa11 51 F.3d at 1099.
189. Id. at 1099-1100 (citation omitted).
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court should consider only "authoritative proof that a foreign
tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid of section
1782."190 Without this authoritative proof, the statute's twin
aims must guide a district court's decision. 19 1
Upon examination of the lower court's reasoning, I9 2 the
Second Circuit concluded that the district court based its decision
not to grant the Section 1782 request on a desire not to offend the
French tribunal. 19 3 The Second Circuit observed that the district
court had failed to apply the appropriate standard: the district
court did not discover any authoritative proof that French officials
objected to foreign discovery assistance. 19 4
Accordingly, the
Second Circuit rejected
the lower court's decision.' 9 5
Additionally, the court noted that the French court had control
over whether MEPA introduced specific evidence: the French
court could stop MEPA from obtaining discovery in a way that
offended French judicial policies, or could refuse to admit
evidence offered by MEPA that, under French procedures, had
been obtained through an "unacceptable practice." 98 The court
made two final suggestions prior to reversing the district court's
denial of MEPA's Section 1782 request: (1) if a district court Is
concerned with its impact upon foreign litigation, it should issue
a "closely tailored discovery order rather than . . . simply deny[]
relief outright"; and (2) if the district court is concerned with
procedural parity (i.e., not allowing a party to circumvent foreign

190.
Id. at 1100. Examples of such authoritative proof could be found, the
court suggested, in a forum country's "Judicial, executive or legislative
declarations that specifically address the use of evidence gathered under foreign
procedures .... " Id.
191.
Id. The court added that a district court must keep in mind the
statute's "overarching interest" in "'providing equitable and efflcacious procedures
for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international
aspects.'" Id. (citing SENATE REPoRT, supra note 25, at 3783).
192.
The district court stated that "granting this petition would undeniably
infringe on the power that the French legislature has bestowed to its courts."
EuromepaL 155 F.R.D. 80, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
193.
EuromepaI,51 F.3dat 1101.
194.
Id.
195. Id.
196.
Id. The court felt that the French court was in control and could "quite
easily protect itself from the effects of any discovery order by the district court
that inadvertently offended French practice." Id.
Since foreign courts could always rule upon the propriety of reliance on

evidence through the cooperation extended by [U.S.] courts when it was
presented to them. . .It [is] both unnecessary and undesirable to let the
propriety of discovery with the aid of [a U.S.] court depend on
discoverability and admissibility under foreign law.
Stir, supranote 55, at 235-36.
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discovery laws), it can premise relief "upon the parties' reciprocal
19 7
exchange of information."
Judge Jacobs rendered a spirited dissent, stating that the
majority opinion unduly limited the district court's discretion,
wrongfully considered the factor of discoverability abroad as
"quite limited," and did not give due deference to foreign attitudes
concerning discovery. 1 98 In particular, Judge Jacobs took issue
with what he perceived was the court's unwarranted and cursory
analysis of the nature of French discovery. 199
In conclusion,
Judge Jacobs suggested that the best route would be to
implement what the Malev court had proposed: use of a discovery
plan, submitted to the foreign court prior to seeking documents
20 0
before a United States court.

IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The most prudent approach for a district court to follow when
presented with a Section 1782 request for assistance is the
reasoning of Euromepa Hf, Glanoll, and Malev. This suggested
approach more heartily embraces the twin aims of Section 1782
by not imposing threshold, extra-statutory barriers to
assistance. 20
Instead, a district court judge retains the

197. Euromepa 1,51 F.3d at 1101-02.
198. Id. at 1102 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). While Judge Jacobs did not favor
the imposition of a threshold discoverability requirement like the Asta Medica
court, he did stress that discoverability in a foreign forum was a "useful tool" for a
district judge, as the Second Circuit had recognized in Glanoll. In re Application
of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 443 (1993).
The dissent seemed troubled that MEPA had not taken steps under French
procedure to obtain the material requested, Euromepa II, 51 F.3d at 1103
(Jacobs, J., dissenting).
199. Euromepa HI,51 F.3d at 1104 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). Judge Jacobs
stated that the majority opinion, while acknowledging that discoverability abroad
is a useful tool, nonetheless unduly limited the scope of this line of inquiry. Id.
Judge Jacobs also expressed concern with how a district court would discern
authoritative proof." Id.
200. Id. at 1105 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (citing In re Application of Malev
Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S.Ct. 179
(1992)).
201. See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text; see also United States
v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S 235, 242 (1989). The U.S. Supreme Court stated
that the "plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare
cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.'" Id. (citation omitted). A
literal application of § 1782 does not produce results at odds with the drafters'
intentions, as the Second Circuit cases and numerous commentators-most
notably. Professor Smit-have revealed.
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discretion to utilize discoverability as a tool, but is not required,
at the outset, to make a discoverability determination. Moreover,
the Second Circuit's interpretation of the legislative intent behind
20 2
Section 1782 is fortified by numerous commentators.
Most importantly, the suggested approach does not require a
threshold showing that the material requested be discoverable
under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction where the proceeding is
pending. 20 3 This proposition is persuasive for several reasons.
The requirement of discoverability is a significant obstacle; it has
the potential to create complex questions of foreign law and can
also be extremely time-consuming. 20 4
The Second Circuit
approach honors one of the twin aims of Section 1782 by making
assistance
to
foreign
litigants
more
efficient
and
straightforward. 20 5
In addition, it does not result in the
imposition of an extra-statutory obstacle, which also accords with
20 6
the legislative history of the statute.
The rejection of a discoverability requirement also does not
interfere with the statutory grant of discretion to district court
judges. While there is no evidence of congressional intent to
support an implicit discoverability requirement, a district court,
utilizing its statutory grant of discretion, can inquire whether the

202. Specifically, the interpretations espoused by Smit and Amram are
echoed in the Glanoll and Malev decisions.
See supra notes 39-53 and

accompanying text. In fact, the only language that relates to discoverability in the
statute Is permissive. See Peter Metis, Note, International Judicial Assistance:
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Contain an Implicit Discoverability Requirement?, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 332, 363 (1994) (Also stating that "there is nothing in the
wording or structure of the statute that suggests that a discoverability
requirement exists.").
203. This is consistent with the Second Circuit's opinions in Gianoll and
Malev. The majority of commentators endorse this approach. See Smit, supra
note 55, at 234-38. Smit strongly urges courts not to adopt the discoverability
requirement, noting that it goes against the "letter and spirit" of § 1782. See
Donahue, supra note 59, at 597 ("Compelling a district court to make preliminary
rulings regarding foreign discovery laws is inefficient, unnecessary, and
inconsistent with the policy underlying the statute.").
204.
See Euromepa 11, 51 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing
foreign law determinations as "costly, time-consuming, and Inherently
unreliable"); see also Stahr, supra note 15, at 613 ("To limit section 1782
discovery by reference to foreign discovery would thus place a significant burden
on the litigants and the federal district courts."). See also Newman & Burrows,

supra note 84, at 3 (attempting to make foreign law determinations could lead to

incorrect results).
205.
See supra notes 24, 35, 36 and accompanying text; see also SENATE
REPORT, supra note 25, at 3788.
206.
SENATE REPoRT, supra note 25, at 3788; see also Smit, supra note 55,

at 236; In re Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1993). cert denied, 114
S.Ct. 443 (1993); In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100
(2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992).
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20 7
material requested is discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction.
This approach sensibly avoids second-guessing Congress and also
provides a mechanism-judicial discretion-with which concerns
about discoverability and potential abuse of the U.S. discovery
laws can be addressed.
Under the umbrella of judicial discretion, a district court has
an arsenal of weapons to combat the concerns, vocalized most
notably by the First and Eleventh Circuits, about potential misuse
of liberal U.S. discovery rules. 20 8 The Malev and Euromepa Hf
courts each suggested several methods to facilitate the handling
of Section 1782 requests. First, the district court presented with
the request can limit unreasonably broad or cumulative discovery
through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). 20 9 The district
court can also use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to restrict
2 10
the discovery to specified terms, conditions, and matters.
Second, the district court could require an applicant to submit a
discovery plan to streamline matters and also to illustrate to the
court that there is not another method of discovery that is more
convenient or less burdensome. 2 1 1 Third, the Euromepa Hf court
suggested that to guide a district court's inquiry into the
discoverability of requested materials, the district court should
only consider "authoritative proof" that a foreign tribunal would
2 12
reject evidence obtained through a Section 1782 request.

Fourth, the Euromepaff court, aware of Section 1782's twin aims,
also recommended that a district court should consider issuing a
discovery order rather than denying relief
"closely-tailored"
2 13
outright.
By following these suggestions, a district court would not
impose any threshold extra-statutory barriers, but would be able
to handle the request, if needed, through its statutorily conferred
discretion. Moreover, the district court would not be issuing
speculative rulings on foreign attitudes toward discovery
proceedings. If a district court issued a ruling precluding

207. Glanoll, 3 F.3d at 60; see also Malev. 964 F.2d at 100.
208. Both the First and Eleventh Circuits are primarily concerned with
circumvention of foreign discovery rules through a § 1782 application. See In re
Application of Asta Medica. S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Request for
Assistance from Ministry of Legal Action of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151,
1156 (11th Cir. 1988).
209. Malev, 964 F.2d at 102 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).
210. Malev, 964 F.2d at 102 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)).
211.
Malev, 964 F.2d at 102.
212. Euromepa ff, 51 F.3d 1095. 1100 (2d Cir. 1995); see also supra notes

190-97 and accompanying text.
213. Euromepa ff. 51
accompanying text.

F.3d at

1101; see also supra note

197 and
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discovery, it would be predicated only on authoritative proof. This
is a critical guideline, for it imposes much needed restraint on the
scope of judicial inquiry into foreign law. The authoritative proof
standard ensures that the twin aims of Section 1782, and not a
speculative inquiry into foreign law, informs the district court
decision.
The district court's exercise of discretion, when considering
Section 1782 applications, must not be blind to the concerns
voiced by the First and Eleventh Circuits. Still, it seems a bit farfetched that district courts will be flooded by discovery requests
pursuant to Section 1782. Furthermore, such a result does not
present a valid reason for second-guessing Congress' decision to
implement the statute. 2 14
Fear of circumvention of foreign
discovery laws is a more legitimate concern.
Though some
commentators debate whether Section 1782 is used for this
purpose, 2 15 it nonetheless is a viable concern when considering
the second of the twin aims-the encouragement of reciprocity.
The court's approach in Euromepa I perhaps was overzealous in
its attempt to avoid offending the French court. Circumvention of
foreign discovery laws is a factor that a judge should weigh, but
this consideration must be tempered by a necessarily literal
interpretation of the statute, as well as a need for judicial
restraint in interpreting foreign law. This judicial restraint is a
product of the prudent, "authoritative proof' standard suggested
by the Euromepa 1H court. A district court could not exercise
judicial restraint if it were required to make a threshold
discoverability determination when presented with a Section 1782
request.
A. Should Judges be Expected to Divine ForeignLaw?
The district court's approach in Euromepa I raised a twotiered problem: whether a domestic district court judge should

214. See Donahue, supra note 59, at 597 ("Even if the statute imposed
significant burdens on district courts, the court of appeals should not second
guess Congress's policy choice by limiting the statute's scope.").
215. See Newman & Burrows, supra note 63, at 3.
Litigants in civil cases in foreign countries seem not to have had such
great interest in trying to avail themselves of the benefits of § 1782. When
such litigants do make applications under § 1782, it cannot necessarily be
concluded-as our courts tend to do-that they are attempting to use the
United States district courts to engage in U.S.-style discovery. Such an
applicant may well be simply seeking evidence for presentation in [the]
case abroad and not engaging in a proverbial fishing expedition for
evidence to support [the] case.
Id.; see also Smit. supra note 55, at 236.

1996

EXTRA-STATUTORY DISCOVERY REQUIREMENTS

151

interpret and apply foreign law, and whether that district court
judge is able to interpret and apply foreign law.2 16 In the opinion,

the court admitted
that its analysis of French law was a
"superficial" one. 2 17 According to Euromepa 11, however, an in-

depth analysis of foreign law-which can be difficult and
dangerous-is not necessary to a district court's determination of
whether to grant a Section 1782 order.2 18 In fact, often a cursory
2 19
analysis of foreign law suffices to arrive at the correct result.
Still, in the event that the analysis will necessarily involve
volumes of documents, as in the Lo Ka Chun case, 2 20 the
argument for analyzing foreign law appears less compelling.
District court judges should not be expected to make complex
foreign law determinations; moreover, these judges must guard
against the result in Euromepa l--'a battle-by-affidavit of
international legal experts." 22 1 Some commentators have added
that aside from being time-consuming, this line of analysis can be
an "imprecise venture." 22 2 District court judges must recognize
when this line of analysis will be beneficial and when it will be too
time-consuming and complex.
It must be remembered that the district court judge has the
discretion to make this inquiry-it is not an inquiry that is
statutorily dictated. 2 23 The suggested approach does not seek to
make interpretation of foreign discovery law a required component
of Section 1782 analysis.
Rather, in light of the specific
circumstances presented by a given case, a district court judge

216.

Smit states that the drafters of the 1964 Amendment did not want

to have a request for [foreign] cooperation turn into an unduly expensive
and time-consuming fight about foreign law.... [Clivil law countries...
often have quite different procedures for discovering information that
could not properly be evaluated without a rather broad understanding of
be wholly
the subtleties of the applicable foreign system. It would ...
inappropriate for [a U.S.] district court to try to obtain this understanding
for the purpose of honoring a simple request for assistance.
Smit, supra note 55, at 235.
217. Euromepal, 155 F.R.D. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
218.
This was precisely the case in Euromepa Hf. See Euromepa Hf, 51 F.3d
1095, 1100 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995).
219.
See In re Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 443 (1993) (describing the district court's cursory, yet accurate,
analysis of the applicable Chilean law).
220. See In re Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To. No. 87-8309 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1987);
Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Stahr, supra note
15, at 613 n.89.
221.
Euromepaff, 51 F.3d at 1099.
222. See Newman & Burrows, supra note 84, at 3.
223. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988).

152

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:117

may examine foreign law if it appears crucial in determining
whether to grant or deny the Section 1782 request. 22 4

The

parameters tempering the judge's discretion are, as the Euromepa
R court suggested: (1) "authoritative proof' that a foreign tribunal
would reject evidence obtained through a Section 1782 request;
and (2) the twin purposes of Section 1782, which, if honored, will
ensure that the judge's
decision is consonant with congressional
225
statutory intent.
B. Concerns of Comity
In the final analysis, district courts must recognize that their
decisions to grant or deny Section 1782 requests impact the
international legal system as well as the U.S. federal courts
system. To promote comity, which has been described as the
"golden rule" of international relations, 226 courts must, if the case
so demands, inquire into foreign procedures.
While district
courts may be limited in their ability to divine foreign law, the
exercise is nonetheless important for concerns of comity. Comity
must inform a judge's decision and, in many cases, may lead to
judicial restraint. 227 Comity serves to reach objective judicial
results that reflect the international value of reciprocal goodwill,
and is essential to the effective long-term functioning of the
international judicial system. 2 28 Its importance is manifest in the

context of Section 1782 and its twin aims.
V. CONCLUSION

The most prudent approach to Section 1782 analysis Is
grounded in the twin aims of the statute: (1) to provide "efficient
means of assistance to participants in international litigation in
our federal courts," and (2) to encourage "foreign countries by
example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts."

229

224.
The Glanoli case seemed to present such a situation.
225.
Again, this approach comports with the reasoning of the Glanoll and
Malev courts. Both courts exalted the twin purposes of 9 1782 but stated that the
Judge's discretion was essential in addressing difficulties with specific requests.
See In re Application of Gianoll, 3 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S.Ct. 443 (1993); In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 102
(2d Cr. 1992). cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992).
226.
See Harold G. Maier, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: Cooperation, Coercion
and the HagueEvidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 242 (1986).
227. Id. at 252-53.
228. Id. at 252.
229.
See Malev, 964 F.2d at 100; Euromepa 1I,51 F.3d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir.
1995).
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By following a policy of judicial restraint regarding inquiries into
foreign law-the authoritative proof standard-a district court
adheres to the twin aims of Section 1782. By following these
principles, courts must reject a threshold showing that material
requested under Section 1782 be discoverable in the foreign
jurisdiction. A district court can-but is not required to-utilize
discoverability of material requested as a tool to help determine if
a Section 1782 request should be granted. The district court
retains a statutory grant of discretion, reinforced unanimously by
the courts, 23 0 to prevent litigants from abusing the liberal U.S.
discovery rules. This approach also ensures that notions of
As
comity and national sovereignty are not compromised.
international disputes continue to arise, there is a greater need
for international judicial cooperation. A balance of Section 1782's
twin aims with a district court's prudent exercise of discretion
and judicial restraint must therefore inform every case involving a
Section 1782 analysis. Only then will the United States legal
system facilitate international judicial cooperation.
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